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To Control or Be Controlled: Predicting Types of Offending in a Corporate 
Environment Using Control-Balance Theory. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Sutherland (1947, 1949) distinguished white collar criminality from traditional crime 
by focusing on how and why professional settings and occupations provided unique 
opportunities for white collar crime (WCC) in the same way that impoverished settings and 
pursuits did for traditional crime. In the white collar world, crime occurred when a business 
professional acted against client or company interests, and in a manner that capitalized on the 
individual’s position within the organization. But for the opportunities afforded by that 
position, the perpetrator could not commit such offenses (Sutherland, 1947). Braithwaite 
(1985) expanded upon this notion by defining corporate crime (not simply white collar crime) 
as involving a corporate employee, working under the umbrella of a legitimate function of the 
corporation, but acting in a manner that would otherwise be considered criminal by applicable 
law. Theories that describe this type of deviance as distinct from other types of crime are rare. 
Rarer still are those that systematically distinguish between WCC and more traditional forms 
of crime. One exception is Tittle’s (1995, 2004) control balance (CB) theory, which proposes 
WCC and traditional crime can be explained through a consideration of ratios of control 
surpluses and control deficits that would-be offenders experience in their day-to-day 
operational environments. 
Control Balance Theory and White collar Crime 
 Since Sutherland delivered his American Sociological Association presidential 
keynote address in 1939, criminological thinking has focused generally on two types of 
deviance; traditional street crime and white collar crime (Benson, Madenson, & Eck, 2009; 
Geis, 1991; Shichor, Gaines, & Schoepfer, 2012; Simon & Eitzen, 2002). Sutherland 
considered white collar crime to include such behaviors as fraud, insider trading, stealing 
corporate secrets, investment schemes, and labor law violations (Sutherland, 1949). Later 
 2 
research expanded this definition to encompass more modern offenses such as cybercrime, 
corporate money laundering, and insider trading with the idea that these crimes could not 
occur outside a corporate setting (Benson, 1985; Benson & Moore, 1992; Geis, 1993; Graber, 
1980; Rosoff, Pontell, & Tillman, 2002), giving rise to the field of occupational crime 
research (Friedrichs, 2002, 2009; Green, 1997, O’Grady, 2011). Conversely, what we refer to 
as traditional street crimes (Southerland’s blue-collar crimes) include offenses captured in the 
Uniform Crime Report such as homicide, sexual assault, robbery, embezzlement, forgery, and 
theft. These offenses do not require a corporate or occupational setting to take place (Clarke, 
1997; Sutherland, 1949). Whereas, the traditional crimes such as theft and forgery are not 
dependent on a pre-existing corporate or occupational condition, fraud and insider trading 
typically are.     
The distinction between these deviance categories is further manifested in their 
disparate prosecution and sentencing characteristics (Coleman, 2005; Reiman & Leighton, 
2002; Richman, 2012; Simpson, 2013). For this and other reasons, few crime theories are 
formulated to explain or predict both street and white collar crime, with street crime accorded 
the bulk of theory development. Most often, scholars call upon a theory originally meant to 
explain traditional street offending and extend it to apply to white collar criminality (Shichor, 
Gaines, & Schoepfer, 2012).  
 Sutherland (1941, 1947) was himself prone to this approach. While he designed 
differential association theory to address traditional crime,1 stating that all crime is a learned 
behavior, he later went on to apply the basic tenets of the theory to both traditional and white 
collar offending, and subsequent research has followed his lead (Coleman, 1987, Cressey, 
2012; Klenowski, Copes, & Mullins, 2011; Piquero, Tibbetts, & Blankenship, 2005).  
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1987, 1990) made a similar argument three decades later with their 
 
1 Sutherland, by his own admission, stated he never meant to spark the divide between traditional and white 
collar crime (Shichor, Gaines, & Schoepfer, 2012).   
 3 
general theory of crime (GTC).  Though its original formulation focused on the explanation of 
traditional crime, they later asserted that the theory’s concepts should extend also into WCC 
because low self-control applies to all behavior and in every environment. Empirical tests of 
this expanded focus of GTC, though, show mixed results (Benson & Moore, 1992; Geis, 
2000; Pratt & Cullen, 2000).    
 Tittle’s CB theory (1995, 2004) is somewhat unique in that it was originally 
formulated to account for the etiology of both traditional and WCC within a single 
framework. Ironically, most subsequent research applied the theory to explain traditional 
deviance (see e.g., Piquero & Hickman, 1999, 2003; Hickman & Piquero, 2001; Hickman, 
Piquero, Lawton, & Greene, 2001; Higgins & Lauterbach, 2004; Higgins, Lauterbach, & 
Tewksbury, 2005).2 This, despite Tittle’s contention that much deviance occurs within 
commercial settings, where opportunities for both traditional and white collar deviance are 
present.  
Introduced in 1995, CB theory has garnered measurable attention3. It is centrally 
focused on how control dictates behavioral responses to criminal opportunities in an 
individual’s environment. In Tittle’s formulation, control is a ratio of two factors; the degree 
to which other people and one’s environment control a person’s behavioral options, and the 
extent to which one can exercise the same over others. Importantly, the ratio of these two 
forms of control determines both whether deviance occurs and the nature of that deviance.  
Control deficits occur when the amount of control over a person exceeds the amount 
of control they can exercise. Control surpluses occur when the amount of control a person can 
exert surpasses the control to which they are subject. According to Tittle (1995), when these 
controls are equally balanced, deviance is unlikely because the amount of control a person has 
 
2 Possibly the result of there being far more data available on traditional crime versus corporate crime. 
3 Cited nearly 500 times since its original publication. 
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over others and their environment offsets the amount of control others and the environment 
have over them.  
Control deficits lead to defiance (e.g., “…illustrative acts such as youthful violation of 
curfews, vandalism, and status restriction, mocking denigrations of company officials by 
striking  workers…”), predation (e.g., “…theft, rape, homicide,…and fraud…”), and 
submission (e.g., “…helping repress others to please power holders…”) (Tittle, 1995; pgs. 
138, 137, and 140 respectively). These types of deviance have in common the motivation to 
restore or establish a kind of balance and can be thought of as “oppositional” or “restorative”4 
in nature. This is because the individuals in this condition have little or no access to more 
sophisticated forms of redress that can be attained through the exploitation of privilege, 
experience, or access and therefore deviate within the confines of those limited opportunities 
available to them and most others at the organizational “bottom of the ladder”.  
Control surpluses are associated with “autonomous” deviance (Tittle, 1995) such as 
those found more commonly in the white collar world because these individuals possess the 
tools, access, and information necessary to conduct this type of activity (Tittle, 2004).  Here 
the motivation to engage in deviance is a product of one’s status and access to offending 
opportunities. The greater the imbalance in this direction, the greater the motivation to exploit 
these more sophisticated types of opportunities. Tittle posited that corporate environments are 
one of the more likely settings where these types of deviances – exploitative (e.g., “…acts of 
corporate price fixing, profiteering from manufacturing processes that endanger workers, 
influence peddling…when those acts involve coercion, manipulation…without regard for the 
 
4 Note that in his critique of Tittle’s work, Braithwaite has argued that Tittle’s use of these three outcomes – 
defiance, predation, and submission – were defined in a way that was cohesive or testable. Our stance is that the 
three concepts have in common a desire on the part of the individual experiencing control deficit to restore or 
achieve balance. Thus, we refer to control deficits as producing “restorative” motivations on the part of the 
individual, subsequently brought about by engaging in acts that harm or take advantage of the organization in a 
manner that is both emotionally satisfying and instrumentally valuable to the offender. This motivation to restore 
balance is also of course at the core of Braithwaite’s own theories, but in those cases, restoration is produced 
through formal means with the goal of producing a different kind of balance. 
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desires or the welfare of the exploited.”), decadence (e.g., “…humiliating people for 
entertainment…), and plunder (e.g., “…massive pollution by giant oil companies with 
accompanying price increases to recover costs of cleanup…) – should occur (Tittle, 1995, 
pgs. 138, 139 respectively; 2004) because these actors have intimate knowledge and access to 
company systems that outsiders would not have. 
Stated earlier, despite Tittle’s contention that CB theory should be applied to both 
white collar and traditional crime, it has been more common for it to be applied to traditional 
forms of crime and victimization, (Baron & Forde, 2007; DeLisi & Hochstetler, 2002; 
Piquero & Hickman, 1999, 2003; Hickman & Piquero, 2001; Hickman, Piquero, Lawton, & 
Greene, 2001; Higgins & Lauterbach, 2004; Higgins, Lauterbach, & Tewksbury, 2005; 
Nobles & Fox, 2013; Piquero, 2001; Savelsberg, 1999; Wood & Dunaway, 1997). To date, 
only one study has explored CB theory as an explanation for deviance in the corporate 
environment. Piquero and Piquero (2006) examined deviance among hypothetical sales force 
managers by asking eighty-seven graduate-level business students to consider a variety of 
scenarios created to test corporate deviance from either a control surplus or deficit.  The 
vignettes presented participants situations and asked them to decide whether or not to exploit 
an entry-level5 subordinate by encouraging the employee to inflate sales statistics.  The results 
indicated that those with a control surplus, as compared to those with a control deficit, were 
more likely to have the intention to exploit the novice worker confirming part of CB theory 
(Piquero & Piquero, 2006).   
Importantly, Piquero and Piquero (2006) recommended that actual corporate sales 
representatives (SR) data would be preferable to their student-based sample, as the former 
would provide improved external validity and comprehensiveness.  Tittle (2004) also noted 
that one of the reasons so few analyses of CB theory exist is that typical datasets did not 
 
5 Less tenured. 
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comprehensively account for all the kinds of information necessary to construct adequate 
measures or operationalize the concepts to test the theory in toto. These points reveal 
fundamental complications scholars have yet to overcome with regard to testing CB theory.  
First, corporate data are difficult to obtain. Companies are protective of their private 
information. Material of this nature, should it become public, might pose a host of risks. 
Second, when data are available they rarely contain the information necessary to 
operationalize a control surplus and a control deficit simultaneously, especially in the same 
setting.   
There is a third issue to which we alluded earlier. CB theory not only predicts when 
offending will occur but, as well, the nature of the offending that will occur (i.e., autonomous 
or oppositional deviance). This more innovative aspect of theory is often acknowledged by 
researchers but not tested, again because of limitations in data, though also due to commonly 
accepted paradigms associated with theory testing in general. Traditional theory testing is 
primarily a deductive exercise where researchers commonly operationalize variables in 
collected data and judge a theory’s worthiness based on the statistical strength of the 
relationship between independent and dependent variables. The majority of criminological 
theories are concerned with when or how much offending will occur under manipulated or 
observed circumstances, and such tests often allow for the comparison of offending and non-
offending groups. CB theory is formulated differently. It predicts differential levels offending 
as well as differential types of offending based on variability in control exerted by and applied 
to the potential offender. As such, comprehensive “testing” of CB theory should involve more 
than simply identifying statistical significance between the independent and dependent 
variables. It should also test whether different levels of control surpluses or deficits result in 
different kinds of offending. It is this challenge that we take up in the current paper. 
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One strategy would be to focus on offenders. This is a common practice in qualitative 
research involving traditional crime (such as street offending), where inductive processes are 
employed to explore not only the decision to offend but also the manner in which that 
offending takes place. Qualitative researchers are sometimes accused of “sampling on the 
dependent variable” by focusing their data collection only on those who offend, but this 
approach makes sense if one is trying to understand the nature of offending itself (see e.g., 
Wright & Decker, 1994; Jacques, 2014). Given the unconventional structure of CB theory, 
with its emphasis not only on offending propensity but also on offending specificity, a similar 
approach would seem a warranted and potentially fruitful endeavor. Our goal in the current 
paper was to apply CB theory to a real-world set of data based in the corporate world, 
allowing us to better understand the etiology of offending in a WCC setting, (i.e., not whether 
offending will occur but how it will occur). This approach also allowed us to examine 
whether CB theory had specific descriptive validity with relation to WCC rather than simply 
as a general theory of offending. To address these goals, we attained access to data comprised 
entirely of offenders in a corporate setting who vary along the parameters set forth in CB 
theory (i.e., a sample that includes offenders with control deficits and those with control 
surpluses).  
Current Study 
In keeping with notion of applying CB theory to settings that maximize external 
validity and comprehensively provide for control surpluses and deficits (Piquero & Piquero, 
2006; Tittle 2004), we rely on case files from a United States financial institution containing 
the actual investigations of SR deviance by the company’s corporate security department.  
These data span eight years and consist of 445 “founded investigations” (equivalent to police 
clearance). 
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The corporation in question is best described as a customer-facing financial services 
provider. It offers products primarily in the electronic transactions industry and solicits its 
services to customers via commission-based SRs coast-to-coast.  The organization divides its 
sales organization into an inside sales force located within corporate headquarters and an 
outside sales force6 positioned in all 48 contiguous states. Also, as one would expect, the 
entire sales force consists of SRs with varying levels of company tenure. We employed 
Tittle’s (1995; pg. 188 & 190) conceptualizations of deviance to identify how the offenses 
committed by each of these SRs in our data could be assigned to either an autonomous or 
repressive category. 
Autonomous deviance occurs when individuals have a control surplus. Such offending 
is more strongly associated with white collar and corporate settings where individuals are 
often able to exploit advantages afforded them by their position within the institution. 
Repressive deviance is more likely to occur among those denied such levels of control, often 
associated with “traditional” or “street settings” where individuals engage in deviance in 
response to excessive or “unfair” levels of control (Tittle, 1995, 2004). But, a careful reading 
of Tittle’s theory clearly intimates that both forms of deviance can take place within corporate 
and white collar settings, with repressive deviance occurring when individuals within the 
organization are heavily controlled and lack access to the kinds of opportunities available to 
those higher up in the organization. In fact, this was borne out in the data that we employed in 
the current study.  
 
6 Made up of SRs working from their homes. It is important to note that there were no systematic differences 
between inside and outside SRs in terms of tenure. Nor were there differences in how someone was assigned to 
inside or outside status (i.e., based on qualifications or tenure). SR assignment is based purely by the needs of the 
company and the geographical location of the sales rep.  The company only hires inside sales reps in its home 
base city because they are local and the sales department is housed at company HQ.  The outside sales force 
spans the entire country, including the home base city but they are assigned using the same standards used 
nationally, limited by geographical location.   
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With the sales position and tenure metrics set, we were able to test CB theory by 
means of four hypotheses for the type of SR control imbalance relative to the type of deviance 
observed (see Figure 1).  The company structure is such that SRs with higher tenure have 
higher levels of experience with the corporation’s inner workings; its policies, regulations, 
processes, network of employees and the company’s organizational structure. Their ability to 
understand the functions and players within the corporate system afford them greater latitude 
to take advantage of the corporate system. Experienced SRs are better able to avoid detection 
and sanctions, and able to engage in more complex forms of deviance. As such, they clearly 
possess a surplus of control.  In contrast, lower tenured SRs lack this experience and access. 
They have permission only to lower level processes and systems that allow for a different 
kind of deviance, and they lack the deeper and more extensive experience required to exploit 
such systems in more complex ways. As well, their lack of experience makes it more likely 
they would be detected and sanctioned for attempting the kinds of deviance perpetrated by 
more sophisticated colleagues. Finally, lower experience employees have less employment 
security, as they are more easily let go than experienced employees if adjustments to the 
company workforce are required. The corporation clearly has the upper hand over such 
employees, preventing them from exerting the same amount of control over their 
circumstances in opposition to the corporation’s control; a deficit.  Thus, we present the first 
hypothesis in the following, two-tiered form. 
 H1a:   SRs with higher levels of company tenure have a control surplus that leads to 
 higher odd of autonomous deviance.   
 H1b: SRs with lower levels of company tenure have a control deficit that leads to
 higher  odds of repressive deviance. 
Further, the level of control an SR has over their day-to-day occupational 
circumstances is also a direct reflection of whether they are assigned to the inside sales force 
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or the outside sales force. Inside SRs are under the direct observation and scrutiny of their 
peers and supervisors. They have far less latitude in when and where they are able to access 
systems, and they are more likely to be questioned about day-to-day activities as a result of 
their frequent “face-time” at the company headquarters. Senior sales management within the 
company confirmed that the corporation has much less control over the behavior and 
circumstances of the SRs assigned to its outside sales force as opposed to those assigned to 
the inside sales force.7  Based on this information, the second hypothesis followed.   
H2a:  SRs with an outside sales position experience a control surplus that leads to 
higher odds of autonomous deviance 
H2b:  SRs with an inside sales position experience a control deficit that leads to higher 
odds of repressive deviance.  
 
 CB theory predicts the least amount of deviance will occur when the amount of control 
exercised on an individual is equal to the amount they can impose; in a theoretically perfectly 
balanced system, deviance would be zero. As the tension between these two forces becomes 
skewed (i.e., falls out of balance), the amount of offending will deviate from zero with the 
 
7 Confirmed to the authors from senior level management via personal correspondence. 
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type of offending expressed – autonomous vs. repressive – based on the type of control 
imbalance experienced. Thus, as potential offenders are exposed to control surpluses, their 
propensity to offend autonomously will increase. Alternatively, as potential offenders are 
exposed to control deficits, their propensity to offend repressively increases apace. As we are 
employing data comprised entirely of reports of verified deviance, the level of offending 
would be lowest (but not zero) at the balance point and highest where imbalance was the 
greatest, i.e., the same “U-shaped” pattern is predicted but shifted upwards from what we 
might obtain from data including offenders and non-offenders8. It is possible to visualize the 
combined outcomes of deviance level and deviance type in the following manner (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. 
METHOD 
Setting 
Through its sales force, the corporation adds upwards of 30,000 new customers to its 
portfolio annually. The company implements and facilitates consumer and business-to-
business transactional commercial systems for corporate consumers through e-verification and 
software- and hardware-based processes. Because the company operates nationwide, it relies 
 
8 Tittle acknowledged that there were baseline differences between offenders and non-offenders (i.e. 
dispositional tendencies to offend) by pointing out the combined effects of predisposition toward offending 
and situational provocations for offending (see Tittle, 1995, pg. 172). 
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on the sales force to verify that customers are conducting a legitimate business. SRs carry the 
necessary paperwork with them to begin the onboarding process which includes requisite 
signatures, items related to the type of business the customer conducts, inventory, sales 
volume, demographics, and information pertaining to business ownership, collateral, and 
creditworthiness. The SR then transmits this information electronically to the corporation’s 
automated risk management system where the process of vetting and boarding the customer 
begins. This process is both rapid and efficient, lessening the time it takes to implement a 
transactional system, begin realizing a profit, and for the SR to receive a commission. Yet, 
with this efficiency comes an inherent weakness. While a rapid and automated system is 
necessary for success in the current technology-driven market, it carries with it certain 
vulnerabilities to deviance by its sales force (Kownatzki, Walter, Floyd, & Lechner, 2013).   
Population 
 The corporation assigns each of its SRs to either the inside or outside sales force.  The 
sole criteria behind this decision is the company’s needs at the time, exclusively based upon 
the location of the applicant.  Only those who live in the immediate vicinity of the official 
company headquarters would be considered for an inside position as this department is housed 
specifically in that structure and requires a physical presence during working hours. All other 
applicants would be considered only for an outside sales position. 
 Beyond location, the only differences between the inside and outside sales forces come 
in the form of office environment, lead generation, and quotas. These SRs offer the same 
services with the same commission structure. Each of them has equal access to the 
corporation’s customer database. Moreover, although SRs may reside in different parts of the 
country, there are no geographic boundaries in terms of potential customers.  Regional 
borders exist solely to define an SR’s management chain.    
Positional status and control 
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The outside sales force consists of SRs spread across the US and operate remotely 
from corporate headquarters. Working from home offices, they are essentially free to set their 
own hours. Communication with their managers is seldom in person, customarily taking place 
by phone, text, or email. In fact, these SR’s managers often do not even reside in the same 
city. Outside SRs work “in the field” and must cultivate relationships, generate their own 
leads, and make sales without the day-to-day assistance or oversight of close management. 
Consequently, their monthly sales quotas are lower than those of the inside sales force. 
Because of each of these factors, outside SRs are able to exert more control over their 
occupational environment and circumstances than can the corporation. Thus, a control surplus 
state exists for these SRs.  Under these conditions, CB theory dictates their deviance should 
occur in autonomous form (Tittle, 1995).   
In contrast to the control surplus outside SRs possess, inside SRs typically operate 
under control deficit conditions. They have desks located inside the operations center of 
company headquarters where their direct, upper, and even executive managers are all in close 
proximity and ever-present, corresponding to a high level of supervision. These SRs have set 
working hours and, unlike their outside sales force counterparts, the management monitors, 
records, and reviews their telephone conversations with potential customers regularly. 
Moreover, because company generated sales leads are funneled to the inside sales force, these 
SRs have higher monthly quotas. Consequently, the corporation clearly exerts more control 
over inside SRs as compared to the control they can employ and inside SRs can be said to 
experience an occupational control deficit. According to Tittle (1995), the deviance displayed 
by inside SRs should therefore be characteristically repressive. 
Tenure and control 
 Position within the sales force is not the only factor that determines whether SRs 
experience a control surplus or deficit. Company tenure also affects the control balance ratio.  
 14 
An SR experiences a fixed, dichotomous control surplus or deficit regarding their inside or 
outside sales position. Tenure with the company however, represents a continuum where 
newer employees are hypothesized to experience control deficits due to enhanced oversight 
and limited access to corporation systems. Meanwhile, more tenured employees experience 
greater autonomy by virtue of lesser levels of management resulting in a control surplus. This 
sliding scale has the added advantage of passing through the area Tittle (1995) called a control 
balance as an SR moves from lower to higher levels of tenure. This also suggests that an 
offender can move from one type of offending (repressive) to another (autonomous) over 
time.  As Tittle (2004) notes: 
There is no necessary reason ... why a person with a control surplus would 
choose mainly from among ‘autonomous’ deviant acts. Indeed, some 
‘repressive’ acts of deviance may be more appropriate to the level of control 
surplus operating in a given instance than are some of the ‘autonomous’ 
misbehaviors. Similarly, persons with a control deficit who become motivated 
toward deviance sometimes may be able to  commit ‘autonomous’ deviant acts 
and may in fact choose them over ‘repressive’ forms. Hence, the continuum of 
seriousness probably does not break nicely in the middle of the control ratio 
continuum, nor does it seem to run on parallel off set tracks as the original 
formulation implied. In fact, ... some research has shown, control  imbalances, 
whether surpluses or deficits, may predict all forms of deviant outcome 
without much differentiation by whether they are ‘autonomous’ or ‘repressive’ 
in nature. (p.400) 
 
 Before proceeding, note that tenure within the corporation does not differentiate one 
SR from another in terms of services and products available to sell, commissions, or the types 
of prospective customers the SR may approach. Rookie and veteran SRs are no different in 
that regard. But, it does affect one’s knowledge of the organization and its processes, allowing 
more experienced (i.e., longer tenured) employees to potentially take advantage of such 
knowledge9. Simply put, lower tenure is more likely to result in a control deficit while higher 
levels of seniority are more likely to result in a control surplus.    
 
9 Experience has similar effects on how offenders operate, with greater experience affording more and better 
opportunities and greater chances of success in criminal activities (see Topalli, 2005; Walters, 2003) 
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Seniority, in fact, is a key determinant of rank in the sales field (Dustmann & Meghir, 
2005; Segalla, Rouzies, Besson, & Weitz, 2006) and offers a wider range of autonomy; a 
distinguishing function of a control surplus (Tittle, 1995). For example, those with higher 
tenure tend to have less supervision performing their duties and feel less pressure to achieve 
quotas.  More tenured SRs have reached a higher level of experience, understanding of 
company systems, and the industry as a whole. Typically, they are also the ones who produce 
a strong revenue stream for the company. The company, therefore, tends not to interfere with 
their daily processes. Consequently, these SRs can exert a greater amount of control over their 
day-to-day activities than the company is willing to apply over them. Ironically, it is exactly 
because of their advanced experience and autonomy that they also know how to exploit the 
system (as suggested by Tittle, 1995).       
Conversely, for the company that provided the data for this study, upper management 
confirmed that, as a matter of common practice, less tenured SRs experience high levels of 
supervision. As a SR’s tenure with the company increases, this level of scrutiny decreases 
apace as they become more familiar with company sales procedures and the internal workings 
of its onboarding systems. This is typical of businesses that employ a sales force. According 
to Wright (2000), newer representatives have little to no autonomy or decision-making 
authority. Further, because of this status, they have limited understanding of company 
procedures and systems. Despite this type of control deficit, this company is not alone in 
applying pressure on its less tenured SRs to achieve sales goals and secure a sustainable 
income (Rollag, Parise, & Cross, 2005, Segalla et al., 2006). At this career stage, the company 
naturally exerts greater levels of control over these newer SRs than they are able to counter. 
This places them squarely in a control deficit condition.  Due to their inexperience, they 
simply lack the ability to exploit (“game”) the system. CB theory dictates that when deviance 
occurs with these less tenured, SRs, it generally takes the form of repressive behavior.   
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Data 
The data used in this study originates from a large US corporation and consists of all 
of the investigations conducted by the company on members of the sales force from 2004 to 
2012 (N=445).10 There were many more allegations of misbehavior made against the sales 
force. However, the cases used in the analysis were only the ones emanating from official 
investigations. The company’s internal investigation’s team, consisting of experienced 
specialists in risk, compliance, and law enforcement, confidentially conducted each of these 
investigations through forensic evidence, customer statements, publicly available information, 
and other internal information. Only in the face of overwhelming evidence did this team then 
conduct interviews with the SR(s) involved. In the majority of the investigations conducted, 
the SRs themselves admitted to the behaviors of which they were accused. At the conclusion 
of the SR interview, the investigations team marked each individual case as either valid, 
invalid, or inconclusive.  For this study, the cases provided to us were only those deemed 
valid by the investigations team.   
The information captured for analysis incudes demographic variables, type of sales 
position, and tenure in months. The dataset also provides information on the type of 
misconduct found such as policy and ethics violations (gaming the system) or criminal acts 
(forgery, theft, altering documents, etc.) committed by the SRs (see Table 1). The company 
graciously provided these data redacting any information that might allow for the 
identification of its SRs or the customers it serves.   
Dependent Variables 
 Stated previously, we are not predicting whether deviance will occur. In fact, in this 
data set it has already occurred. Rather we are exploring that, when deviance does occur, the 
 
10 Note that these data represent the entire population of investigations within the corporation.  Because is it not a 
sample, effect size is emphasized over statistical significance and inference.   
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probability of the type of deviance - autonomous or repressive - is influenced by a control 
surplus or deficit, governed in this study by the variables, status (outside/inside) and tenure.   
Autonomous Deviance 
Tittle (1995) theorized that when a control surplus exists, should deviance take place, 
it will occur autonomously. He further stated this type of deviance would be prevalent in the 
white collar environment (2004). Having a control surplus allows an SR to exploit their 
circumstances by gaming the system.11 We operationalize autonomous deviance as a 
dependent variable, defined as the violation of existing company policy, violations of the 
corporate code of ethics, and violations of non-compete agreements (poaching). Violations of 
policy include such actions as self-dealing - selling equipment to customers on the side 
instead of selling company equipment thereby increasing the money to be made on a sale12 - 
or offering corporate promotions to customers who do not qualify. Ethics violations include 
such behavior as false reporting of sales numbers, encouraging subordinates to commit fraud 
or falsify information, and other deceitful practices. Last, autonomous deviance occurs 
through violations of non-compete agreements with both the current SR’s agreement and 
contracts signed with previous employers.13 Non-compete violations can also take the form of 
a conflict of interest (i.e. working for the corporation and its competitor at the same time). 
Autonomous deviance was operationalized as a dichotomous variable, collapsing the above 
listed behaviors, where their existence was coded as “1,” and otherwise coded as “0.”      
Repressive Deviance 
 A control deficit condition manifests itself by defiant, predacious, or submissive 
deviance (Tittle, 1995). Tittle (1995) defined behavior of this nature as “repressive” types of 
deviance along the lines of traditional criminality. Within this dataset, the SRs who committed 
 
11 As opposed to direct criminality such as in a control deficit – repressive – state. 
12 Because this is done “off the books” it is also tax-free. 
13 Competitors of the subject corporation. 
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repressive deviance did so through four crimes; theft, altering a contract, forgery, and 
rewriting an existing contract (identity theft). We define theft traditionally as “a crime in 
which a person intentionally and fraudulently takes … property of another without permission 
… with the intent of to convert it to the taker’s use” (Garner & Black, 2004). Theft by SRs 
occurred mainly by taking equipment either from the corporation or the customer through 
deceptive means, later converting it to cash or its equivalent.  
 Forging a contract was indicated when an SR submitted paperwork that purports to 
have been signed by the customer when, in fact, the SR signed the document as the customer.  
It also occurred by means of the SR adding a document to the sales agreement (that a 
customer did not agree to) and signing the customer’s name to it, a practice referred to as 
“clean sheeting” (Payne, 2012). Rewriting an existing contract is another type of fraud where 
the SR receives multiple commissions for the same sale. In this case, the SR duplicated the 
original information on a new contract and resubmitted the paperwork as if it were a new 
customer while simultaneously closing out the old contract. SRs who engage in this scheme 
have retained the customer’s information from the original contract, considered by law to be 
identity theft, and committed the crime without the customer’s knowledge.   
 Altering a contract, considered sometimes a different type of forgery, occurred when 
an SR added, deleted, or changed information on the original contract without that customer’s 
knowledge or consent, usually after the customer signed the agreement. This differs in that the 
customer did, in fact, sign the agreement, but particular terms of the agreement (not the 
signature itself) were altered after the signatures were made. SRs typically made this change 
for purposes of charging the unsuspecting customer and company with higher fees for 
services resulting in higher residual payments to the seller. Since each of the SRs receives a 
portion of the profits made on each transaction, altering the agreed upon fees ever so slightly 
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(changing .55 cents per transaction to .88 cents per transaction) adds up to thousands of 
dollars stolen from the customer, and the company, over time.   
 Tittle (1995, 2004) contended that these types of deviance are the result of a control 
deficit condition. These crimes were also collapsed into one category, repressive deviance.  
We coded them as “1” if any of these crimes were committed and “0” otherwise.   
Independent variables 
Tenure 
 Tenure in the original dataset was coded as a continuous variable with each increment 
corresponding to one month of employment. When analyzing this variable in its original form, 
the data had a positive skew violating the regression normality assumption. To correct this, 
we performed a natural log transformation normalizing the distribution and created a new 
continuous variable, LN Tenure (see Figure 2).  We used this new variable in the final 
analyses.    
                      Figure 2:  Natural Log Transformation of Months Tenure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sales Position  
 The sales position variable delineated the SRs occupational status. We created two 
variables, outside and inside, to represent this status. Assignment to an outside sales position 
resulted in a coding of the outside variable as a “1” otherwise “0.”  In the same manner, a 
coding of “1” on the inside variable indicated a SRs assignment to the inside sales force and a 
“0” coding designated he or she was not a member of this group. Practically, these variables 
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are mirrors of each other since SR assignment is either to the outside or inside sales force; 
however, creating these two separate variables allowed for a more intuitive interpretation of 
the analyses to follow.   
Control Variables14 
Sex 
 Bureau of Justice Statistics data show that males are generally more criminogenic than 
females (BJS, 2011).  It was reasonable then to anticipate that the SR’s biological sex could 
influence deviant behavior. Sex was consequently held constant in each of the statistical 
models.  Males received a dichotomous coding of “1” and females a “0.”    
Age  
 Research suggests that individuals aged 41 to 50 more often commit corporate fraud 
than any other age group. Persons over 40 commit more than half of the total number of the 
corporate crimes reported in the US each year (ACFE, 2008).  The data also show that age is a 
predictor of traditional crime (FBI, 2015).  As this could confound the current analysis results, 
our model included age as a continuous control variable.   
Analytical strategy 
 Testing the proposed hypotheses began with a descriptive analysis summarizing the 
data. From a purely descriptive standpoint, Tittle’s concept of a control balance and 
imbalance became evident in the data (see Figure 3 in the Results section). We then turned 
our attention toward a method to incorporate the notion of a control balance ratio in 
determining the type of expected deviance given the predictors contained in the dataset.   
Because the outcome variables used in this study are dichotomous, binary logistic 
regression analysis was the most appropriate design.  Not only did it account for the non-
linearity of the variables, this technique also provides the odds ratios of SR engagement in 
 
14 Race was not included because there was no variance in this unit of measurement.   
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repressive or autonomous deviance by means of their position or tenure.15  While Tittle did 
not specifically propose a singular, specific analytical strategy to explicate the control balance 
ratio, we saw value in approximating this through the odds ratios produced when 
exponentiating the regression coefficient and at the same time accounting for the curvilinear 
shape of a control imbalance as originally described in the theory.  Moreover, due to the 
continuous nature of the tenure predictor variable, we employed second order exponentiation 
on the right-hand side of the equation as a method of confirming the logistic regression 
results, accounting even further for the theoretical curvilinear nature of the control balance 
and imbalance characteristics. Finally, other non-linear regression techniques such as 
segmented or spline regression could not produce as good a proxy for Tittle’s hypothesized 
ratio as they did not lend themselves as well to the data at hand. 
By deploying binomial logistic regression as our primary analytical method, we 
specifically expected that autonomous deviance committed by SRs would occur through a 
control surplus afforded by either an outside sales position or advanced tenure and, 
correspondingly, that repressive deviance could be explained by a control deficit condition 
due to an inside sales position or lesser levels of tenure.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive analysis 
Table 1 displays the results of the descriptive analysis.  Autonomous deviance 
accounted for half of the cases (49.4%, N=225) contained in the dataset. Ethics violations 
accounted for 18.2% (N=81) of the total cases.  Policy violations marked 21.3% (N=95) of the 
cases in the dataset and non-compete violations made up 9.9% (N=44) of the investigations.   
 
 
 
15 Bivariate analyses were performed and found to be consistent with regression results.  Thus, the bivariate 
results were excluded from this publication.  
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Table 1:  Descriptive Analysis (N=445) 
Dichotomous variables  Frequency Percentage 
Autonomous deviance Yes 220 49.4 
 No 225 50.6 
Ethics violations Yes 81 18.2 
 No 364 81.8 
Policy violations Yes 95 21.3 
 No 350 78.7 
Non-compete violations Yes 44 9.9 
 No 401 90.1 
Defiant deviance Yes 225 50.6 
 No 220 49.4 
Forgery Yes 84 18.9 
 No 361 81.1 
Rewriting a contract Yes 12 2.7 
 No 433 97.3 
Altering a contract Yes 104 23.4 
 No 341 76.6 
Theft Yes 109 24.5 
 No 336 75.5 
Outside SR Yes 358 78.2 
 No 87 19.6 
Male SR Yes 348 78.2 
 No 97 21.8 
Continuous variables Mean (SD) Min Max 
Months tenure 37.96(30.90) 2 176 
LN months tenure 3.27(.92) 0.69 5.17 
SR age 43.21(9.38) 23 67 
 
Repressive deviance made up the remainder of the cases in the population (50.6%, 
N=220).  Forgery cases represented 18.9% (N=84) of the population.  Rewriting a contract 
made up 2.7% (N=12) of the cases in the study.  The SRs altered contracts in 23.4% (N=104) 
of the cases and committed theft 24.5% (N=109) of the time.   
The last two dichotomous variables were SR sales position and biological sex. The 
majority of the investigations involved SRs assigned to the outside sales force (80.4%, 
N=358) as opposed to the inside sales force (19.6%, N=87).  Similarly, male SRs were 
represented in 78.2% (N=348) of the cases versus their female counterparts (21.8%, N=97). 
 There were two continuous variables in the model; tenure and age.  The average SR 
months tenure was 37.96 months (S.D. = 30.90).  Mentioned previously, this variable was 
positively skewed but corrected through a natural log (LN) transformation.  Utilized in the 
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final regression analyses, this new variable, LNTENURE, represented this measure 
(mean=3.27, S.D. = .92).  The second continuous variable in the analysis was the age of the 
SR.  This variable ranged from 23 to 67 years of age averaging 43.21 years (S.D. = 9.38).   
Tittle (2004) emphasized that “those with control balances are theorized to conform 
most of the time” (p. 397).  This is the point were the ratio between the amount of control on 
both sides of the spectrum are essentially the same.  Tittle further argued that the further a 
person is removed from this balance point, the higher the respective defict or surplus ratios 
and the greater the likely of deviant behavior (1995, 2004). Consistent with this notion, and 
confirming our original prediction (see again Figure 1), this is in fact what we encountered 
(see Figure 4). There is a marked dip in the level of offending where tenure is at its mid-point.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Control Balance Point 
 From a purely descriptive persective, the frequencies of both repressive and 
autonomous deviance are highest at the extreme ends of the months tenure timeline. Closer to 
the center of the graph is the hypothesized and (in this study) actual balance point where 
deviance is at its lowest. Thus, it could be argued that the frequency of deviance displayed in 
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Figure 4 offers strong support for the idea that (1) Tittle’s theoretical balance point in fact 
exists and (2), the distance in either direction from that point acts as an indicator of the ratio 
of control experienced and exerted through the amount of deviance that actually occurs.   
Regression analyses 
Hypotheses H1a and H1b 
The first variable tested as a predictor of autonomous deviance was LNTENURE both 
by itself (Model 1) and with controls (Model 2).  The results, shown in Table 2, support 
hypothesis H1a that higher levels of SR months’ tenure increased the odds of autonomous 
deviance.  Formally, Model 1 employed a naïve binary logistic regression formula: 
 𝑔(𝑥) =  𝑙𝑛 (
𝜋
1−𝜋
) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝐿𝑁𝑇  
where LNT is the LNTENURE variable.  We then calculated the odds ratio through 
exponentiation of its regression coefficient: OR=𝑒𝛽1.  Model 2 utilized a multivariate binary 
logistic regression analysis with LNTENURE predicting autonomous deviance but also 
controlling for sex, age, and sales position considering their potential ability to confound the 
results.  The equation was such that: 
 𝑔(𝑥) =  𝑙𝑛 (
𝜋
1−𝜋
) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝐿𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑥𝑜𝑢𝑡  
where LNT = LN months’ tenure, male = 1 if the SR was male, age = the age of the SR, and 
out = 1 if the SR held an outside sales position.  Again, the odds ratio calculation occurred 
through exponentiation of 𝛽1.  
In addition to the regression coefficients and odds ratios, Table 2 displays standard 
error and significance levels for each variable. This table, and in the remainder of the results 
tables to follow, also reports Pearson’s Chi-square test of model fit and Cox and Snell’s 
pseudo-R2 values. Experts consider the Cox and Snell pseudo-R2 calculation a more 
conservative estimate than, for example, Nagelkerke’s R2 (Weinberg & Abramowitz, 2008).  
Considering the complexities of measuring a control surplus and control deficit, we opted for 
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more conservative estimates. Finally, variance inflation factor (VIF) calculations indicated no 
multi-collinearity among the model variables further verifying the models.   
Table 2: H1a - Regressions with LNTENURE predicting Autonomous deviance (N=445) 
 Model 1: LNTENURE  Model 2: LNTENURE with controls 
 B(SE) Sig. Exp(B) B(SE) Sig. Exp(B) 
Intercept -1.793(.378) .000 .166 -1.710 .007 .181 
LNTENURE .540(.111) .000 1.715 .524(.112) .000 1.719 
Male --- --- --- .089(.240) .709 1.090 
Age --- --- --- -.013(.011) .228 .987 
Outside SR --- --- --- .484(.251) .055 1.619 
 Chi square = 26.26 p=.000 df=443 Chi square=28.6 p=.000 df=4 
 Cox and Snell R2=.054  Cox and Snell R2=.090  
  
 Model 1 indicated that, without including control variables, the odds of committing 
autonomous deviance increase by 1.715 times with each incremental rise in months’ tenure 
(p=.000).  Months tenure by itself explained just over five percent of the variance in 
autonomous deviance (R2=.054, p=.000, chi square=26.26, df=443).  Model 2 estimated the 
effect of LNTENURE on autonomous deviance with the control variables.  The results 
confirmed that, even when factoring in possible confounders, as tenure accumulates the odds 
of committing autonomous deviance are increased 1.719 times for each additional 
(logarithmic) month increase (p=.000). Therefore, because having increased tenure provides 
the SR with a control surplus and this same variable predicts autonomous deviance, the results 
support hypothesis 1a. Within the corporate sales environment, a control surplus predicts 
higher odds of committing autonomous deviance.  Furthermore, the pseudo R2 value in Model 
2 increased to 0.09 indicating that the combined variables explain nine percent of the variance 
in autonomous deviance. While this pseudo R2 level is not particularly high, it is consistent 
with prior analyses supporting CB theory (Piquero & Hickman, 2003; Piquero & Piquero, 
2006; Higgins et al., 2004). 
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Models 3 and 4, tested hypothesis 1b which stated that lower levels of corporate tenure 
place an SR at higher odds of repressive deviance through a control deficit. Table 3 lists these 
results.  Repressive deviance - autonomous deviance’s dichotomous mirror - was regressed on 
LNTENURE using the same type of equation in this first analysis.  Model 3 shows the results 
of repressive deviance regressed on LNTENURE with no controls.  Considering only these 
two variables, the negative coefficient (B = -0.540) indicates that as tenure increases, the odds 
of committing repressive deviance decreases. In fact, the odds ratio is halved with every 
increase (Exp(B)=.542).16  Since less tenured SRs are in a control deficit condition, it follows 
that they would indeed engage more often in repressive behavior but as tenure increases, the 
control deficit gives way to a control surplus and so too the odds of committing repressive 
deviance decrease having been replaced with autonomous behavior through understanding of 
company systems. 
Model 4 as in Model 2, also held constant the SR’s age, biological sex, and sales 
position.   
Table 3: H1b - Regressions with LNTENURE predicting Repressive deviance (N=445) 
 Model 3: LNTENURE  Model 4: LNTENURE with controls 
 B(SE) Sig. Exp(B) B(SE) Sig. Exp(B) 
Intercept 1.793 (.378) .000 5.99 1.225 (.589) .037 3.404 
LNTENURE -0.540 (.111) .000 .583 -.542 (.112) .000 .582 
Male --- --- --- -.090 (.240) .710 .407 
Age --- --- --- .013 (.011) .228 1.013 
Inside SR --- --- --- .481 (.251) .055 1.617 
 Chi square = 25.35 p=.000 df=444 Chi square = 25.35 p=.000 df=4 
 Cox and Snell R2=.041  Cox and Snell R2=.050  
 
 
16 Put another way, as tenure decreases, the odds of committing repressive deviance are increased.   
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 The results demonstrate that as SR tenure increases the odds of committing repressive 
deviance significantly decrease (Exp(B) = -.542, p=.000).  These results indicate that lower 
tenured SRs are at higher odds of committing repressive deviance supporting hypothesis 1b.  
Because these same individuals are subject to a control deficit, Tittle’s (1995, 2004) concepts 
behaved, again as predicted. 
Hypotheses H2a and H2b 
 The second hypothesis stated an SR would also commit deviance by means of the 
control surpluses and deficits inherent to the type of sales position (status) they occupy. The 
results shown in Table 4 support this supposition. Hypothesis 2a theorized that having an 
outside sales position provides an SR with a control surplus increasing the odds of committing 
autonomous deviance.  Model 5 tested this hypothesis by first regressing autonomous 
deviance on an outside sales position alone.  Model 6 then tested this with control variables.  
 
Table 4: H2a - Regressions with outside sales position predicting autonomous deviance (N=445) 
 Model 5: Outside Position  Model 6: Outside position with controls 
 B(SE) Sig. Exp(B) B(SE) Sig. Exp(B) 
Intercept -0.444 (.220) .043 .642 -1.709 (.636) .007 .181 
Outside SR .522 (.244) .032 1.685 .482 (.251) .055 1.619 
Male --- --- --- .089 (.240) .709 1.093 
Age --- --- --- -0.013 (.011) .228 .987 
LNTENURE --- --- --- .542 (.112) .000 1.719 
 Chi square = 4.669 p=.031 df=444 Chi square = 28.60 p=.000 df=4 
 Cox and Snell R2=.010  Cox and Snell R2=.090  
 
Because of the dichotomous coding of the outcome and most of the predictor variables, the 
results in Model 6 echo Model 2.  The formula and results remain the same but are arranged 
in different order to reflect the switch of the outside variable from control to predictor and 
vice versa for LNTENURE:   
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𝑔(𝑥) =  𝑙𝑛 (
𝜋
1 − 𝜋
) =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑥𝐿𝑁𝑇 
In Model 5, outside SRs were found to have 1.685 times higher odds of committing 
autonomous deviance than their inside SR counterparts (p= 0.032) without control variables. 
When adding the controls (Model 6), the findings show that outside SRs are at 1.619 times 
higher odds of committing autonomous deviance (p=.055).17  These results indicate that if an 
SR can exert more control over the way he or she conducts business than the corporation can 
exert back, as an outside SR is able to do, this significantly increases the odds of autonomous 
deviance. 
Hypothesis 2b stated that inside SRs are at greater odds of committing repressive 
deviance due to a control deficit through occupational status. The regression results, displayed 
in Table 5, confirm this hypothesis.  Model 7 illustrates the direct effect of an inside sales 
position on repressive deviance without controls.  By itself, having an inside sales position 
increases the odds of committing repressive deviance by a factor of 1.686 times (p=.032).  
Model 8 shows the results when the control variables are included in the equation.  The 
findings in Model 8 are also supportive of the hypothesis.  The odds of an inside SR engaging 
in repressive deviance were 1.617 times that of an outside SR. Since inside SRs typically 
experience a control deficit, once more, the model behaved according to Tittle’s (1995) 
concepts.18     
 
 
 
17 Although the p-value is slightly outside the range of an alpha level of <.05, again it is stressed that the data 
utilized is a population and describing the effect size is the more appropriate interpretation.  
18 Although not considered in the original formulation of our hypotheses, the question then arose that, if an 
outside SR is more likely to commit acts of exploitative deviance and that a more tenured SR is at greater odds 
of engaging in this same behavior, would the effect size increase if a tenured SR were a member of the outside 
sales force?  If so, would the same be true for a less tenured SR assigned to an inside sales position committing 
repressive deviance?  Cross product analysis showed this not to be the case.  In both cases, the effect size 
dropped and the interactions were far above the accepted p<.05 standard.  
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Table 5: H2b - Regressions with inside sales position predicting repressive deviance (N=445) 
 Model 7: Inside position  Model 8: Inside position with controls 
 B(SE) Sig. Exp(B) B(SE) Sig. Exp(B) 
Intercept -0.078 (.106) .460 .925 1.225(.589) .037 3.404 
Inside SR .522 (.244) .032 1.686 .482 (.251) .055 1.617 
Male --- --- --- -.090(.240) .710 .407 
Age --- --- --- .013(.011) .228 1.013 
LNTENURE --- --- --- -.541(.112) .000 .582 
 Chi square = 4.669 p=.031 df=444 Chi square = 28.60 p=.000 df=4 
 Cox and Snell R2=.010  Cox and Snell R2=.090  
 
In general, though, while sales position predisposes an SR to certain types of deviance 
there is no guarantee that form of deviance will occur. In fact, the data showed there were 
outside SRs that engaged in the types of behavior predicted for an inside SR and vice versa.  
The results of these analyses consequently demonstrate that the nature of a sales position 
simply provides individuals occupying that status with a “head start” to engage in the 
predicted type of deviance. In effect, if sales position were the only measure of control, SRs 
would experience either a surplus or deficit with no middle ground (i.e. balance). Because of 
the dichotomous nature of sales position (inside/outside: deficit/surplus), the control balance 
mid-point that Tittle emphasizes could not ever be manifested analytically. Yet, in this study, 
tenure also plays a crucial role, one that sheds light into this concept of balance due to its 
continuous in nature.    
 Regression results showed that tenure predicted a particular type of deviance but on a 
sliding scale: Low levels predicted repressive deviance but as tenure incrementally increased 
so too the odds of autonomous deviance. These results offer an empirical glimpse into Tittle’s 
theoretical balance point. While a SRs status conditions a person to a particular type of 
deviance, tenure tends to play the key role in the deviance. For instance, a newly hired SR 
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assigned to the outside sales force has a control surplus through position, normally a status 
conditioning autonomous deviance. Yet that individual’s tenure has not yet reached a level 
where that autonomy becomes a tool toward deviance. Consequently, while the working 
conditions of an outside SR predispose them to autonomous deviance through a control 
surplus, the fact that they are new to the company may cause them to fall back on more 
traditional (repressive) types of criminality until familiarity with the system allows for 
autonomous deviance. We suggest then that tenure, with its incremental nature, is the 
underlying vehicle toward imbalances and balances within the sales force. The more 
influential piece of the deviance equation, thus, is tenure due to its continuous, incremental 
nature.   
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate that when an SR is first hired the odds of engaging in 
repressive deviance are high, yet as time passes the odds of autonomous deviance increase by 
a factor of 1.719 times for each additional increment of tenure. In contrast, outside SRs are at 
1.619 times higher odds of committing autonomous deviance as opposed to their inside SR 
counterparts. The odds ratios resulting from these regressions, in fact, confirm (and clarify) 
Tittle’s original notion that a control imbalance is arrayed continuously as fractions or 
proportions (1995, p. 161).  More importantly, these results make tenure the more 
contributory influence because of its incremental nature. Low levels of tenure are 
synonymous with low levels of experience and are more likely to produce repressive 
deviance. As tenure increases, the odds of repressive deviance decrease, and are eventually 
surpassed by the odds of autonomous deviance occurring.  
Given these results, that the odds ratio of an outside SR committing autonomous 
deviance was 1.619 times more than that of an inside SR and that the odds ratio of committing 
autonomous deviance increase by 1.719 times for each months’ tenure, it is important to then 
determine whether the odds ratio would be higher for an outside SR with advanced tenure. 
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The results depicted in Table 4 illustrate that this was, in fact, the case.  By creating an 
interaction term consisting of position times tenure and regressing deviance on this new 
variable, we were able to make a determination as to this question. The odds of a tenured 
outside SR committing autonomous deviance increased 1.758 times with each month 
employed with the company. While only slightly higher than the direct effect of tenure 
(1.719) and a little more than the direct effect of sales position (1.619), the interaction of both 
these conditions does increase the odds ratio incrementally.      
Table 4: Interaction regression results of outside x tenure (N=445) 
 
While the logit function in the logistic regressions converts the non-linear binomial “s-
curve” to a more linear shape, exponentiating the beta values to attain an odds ratio produced 
the value in which we were most interested, regardless of linearity/non-linearity.  As a final 
step in accounting for what Tittle hypothesized as a non-linear (exponential) relationship 
between the types of deviant behavior relative to the strength of the control imbalance, we 
squared the sales position and tenure predictor variables and re-ran the regressions to produce 
the quadratic results. In each case the odds ratios for autonomous deviance remained 
significant and decreased only slightly (Tenure = 1.16***, Outside sales position = 1.58***, 
Interaction = 1.11***).   
DISCUSSION 
Recall that Tittle's (1995) control balance (CB) theory accounts for variation in 
deviance by introducing the notion that control factors should be represented as the ratio of 
the level of control a person can exert versus the level of control they experience. CB theory 
Model 1: Exploitative Model 2: Exploitative with controls
B(SE) Sig. Exp(B) B(SE) Sig. Exp(B)
Intercept -0.035 (0.097) 0.720 0.966 0.514 (0.494) 0.298 1.672
INTERACTION 0.555 (0.121) .000 1.742 0.565 (0.122) .000 1.758
Male --- --- --- 0.1 (0.237) 0.686 1.101
Age --- --- --- -0.015 (0.010) 0.167 0.99
Chi Square = 27.05 p = .000 df = 444 Chi Square = 31.11 p = .000 df = 441
Cox and Snell  R
2
 = 0.055 Cox and Snell R
2
 = .092
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postulates that the probability of deviance will increase as control ratios become unbalanced. 
When the control that an individual has over their environment and others is greater than the 
control exerted on them, the nature of this deviance will be autonomous: Individuals will take 
advantage of their position and access to resources to better their situation. However, when 
the control that an individual has over his environment and others is less than the control 
exerted on them, the nature of this deviance will be repressive: Individuals limited by their 
access to resources and opportunities will respond with more traditional forms of instrumental 
deviance.  
CB theory’s strength lies in its ability to account for the effect of variable levels of 
control (Tittle, 1995) and its consideration of desire for control (Piquero, Schoepfer, & 
Langton, 2008), Tittle, 2004) as a motivator in and of itself. Importantly, it also accounts for 
both white collar and street deviance, and thus is one of the few theories designed to consider 
all deviance/offending in a unified manner. In practice, the theory has not often been applied 
as Tittle intended. Though CB theory was meant to address all types of crime, it has been 
overwhelmingly applied to explain traditional rather than white collar deviance (Piquero & 
Hickman, 1999, 2003; Hickman & Piquero, 2001; Hickman, Piquero, Lawton, & Greene, 
2001; Higgins & Lauterbach, 2004; Higgins, Lauterbach, & Tewksbury, 2005). The theory’s 
key weakness however, has lied in its testability. Its propositions are complex and it 
conceptualizes variables whose functions operate interdependently and require simultaneous 
consideration in a comprehensive test. Thus, previous research testing CB theory has been 
sparse, limited by available data most often focused on traditional crime. Consequently, when 
it has taken place, the majority seems to have been more on parts of the theory rather than the 
whole (see e.g., Piquero & Hickman, 1999, 2003; Hickman & Piquero, 2001; Hickman, 
Piquero, Lawton, & Greene, 2001; Higgins & Lauterbach, 2004; Higgins, Lauterbach, & 
 33 
Tewksbury, 2005) although a few studies do encompass its entirety (see e.g., Baron & Forde, 
2007; DeLisi & Hochstetler, 2002).   
For these reasons, we sought to expand the test of CB theory by employing a data set 
containing a population made up of different but related groups of white collar offenders 
experiencing varying levels of control and able to exert varying levels of control. Moreover, 
the ratios of control exerted versus control experienced by these groups was systematic 
according to the individual’s position within the company. Our data are drawn from 
individuals with greater control over their settings because of their tenure within the company 
(shorter vs. longer) and because of their access to different kinds of criminal opportunities as 
facilitated by status (sales people working internally having restricted opportunities while 
those working off-site have more discretion). 
Employing this sample of actual cases of sales representative (SR) deviance, we 
hypothesized specific types and likelihoods of deviance. Related to tenure within the 
company, (1) those with longer tenure with the corporation are at higher odds of committing 
autonomous deviance, while (2) those with lesser tenure are at higher odds of committing 
repressive deviance. Likewise, related to status of the individual (3) those in an outside sales 
position are at higher odds of committing autonomous deviance and, (4) those in an inside 
sales position are at greater odds of committing repressive deviance. In each case, the 
evidence supported these hypotheses. At least in this corporate sales environment, Tittle’s CB 
theory explained both autonomous and repressive deviance. Analysis showed that having 
advanced tenure allows SRs to exert a higher level of control over the system than 
organizational controls can apply on them, resulting in autonomous deviance (see Table 2).  
Similarly, the newer an SR was to the corporation the more control the company had over 
their activities, which predicted higher odds of repressive deviance (see Table 3). The second 
hypothesis assumes that sales position (inside vs. outside) is associated with an invariable 
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amount of control. Outside sales forces are assumed to inherently provide the individual with 
a control surplus, while inside SRs were subject to control deficits. The first part of this 
hypothesis suggested that an outside sales position afforded an SR a control surplus 
subsequently increasing the odds of autonomous deviance. Outside SR were, in fact, found at 
1.619 times the odds of committing autonomous deviance compared to their inside sales 
counterparts. Reflectively, through a control deficit, members of the inside sales force had 
1.617 times the odds of committing repressive deviance in opposition to outside SRs. Again, 
Tittle’s (1995) concepts held true. 
Implications for control balance theory 
These findings have important implications for CB theory. To begin, as Tittle (1995, 
2004) predicted, it is an especially useful theory by which to evaluate deviance in a white 
collar environment. In effect, the state of a person’s imbalance predicts the type of deviance in 
which the individual will engage.  Yet, this analysis presents deeper implications for CB 
theory. The findings confirm Tittle’s contention that the motivation for deviance is different 
for autonomous versus repressive deviance.  
Consider that a control deficit occurs because an entity (in this case the company) is 
exerting greater control over a person than that individual is able to counter. Consider further 
that one of the forms of deviance resulting from a control deficit is defiance. Thus, it can be 
surmised that the source of motivation for this deviance originates with the entity exerting the 
greater control; the source in this case being the corporation. The same principle holds for a 
control surplus. The source of greater control here is the individual because they have more 
control over the company. Since the individual is more in control, it follows that the source of 
the motivation to commit deviance originates from that person.   
In light of our results, when deviance is present the associated motivation for that 
behavior shifts depending on the source of control, suggesting a dynamic process. The 
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analysis of sales position – outside versus inside – illustrated this in the form of a dichotomy. 
However, by virtue of our results demonstrating tenure predicted deviance, motivation 
appears to function continuously rather than discretely. Since tenure is an incremental 
variable19 where lower amounts predict repressive deviance and higher levels forecast 
autonomous deviance, control, from a practical standpoint, must therefore be incremental. The 
data show that, through company tenure from the first through last days, a SR goes from an 
extreme control deficit where motivation originates completely from a non-internal source to 
an extreme control surplus where the motivation source is wholly internal. As the control ratio 
favors one condition– surplus or deficit – the motivation source slides along the same axis 
simultaneously (see Figure 3).   
         Figure 3:  Motivation as a function of balance and source. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deviance motivation, therefore, is now a function of the change in control relative to the 
change in the source of that control. So, the type of deviance observed shifts as the motivation 
changes due to the type of control imbalance and the relative source of that imbalance. In this 
study, this indeed appears to be the case as lower levels of tenure place SRs in a control 
deficit condition. Because the company is clearly exerting more control over the new SR 
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(especially in extremely low levels of tenure), that external pressure appears to be the impetus 
that motivates the repressive behavior. The results also indicate the reverse to be true with 
high levels of tenure. 
 A critical aspect of this study involves the use of two variables – one dichotomous and 
the other continuous – to make predictions about the likelihood and type of deviance in which 
individuals will engage. While potential issues to do with combining such variables in one 
analysis have been dealt with in the results section, the conceptual implications are considered 
here. SR status operates in many ways as an organismic variable. One cannot operate with 
both statuses (inside or outside) at the same time, and each type of status is imbued with a 
certain level of control. What does this mean for the theory’s prediction of deviance?  
 In the present study we found a main effect of status in the predicted direction. Outside 
SRs had higher probabilities of engaging in autonomous deviance while inside SRs had higher 
probabilities of engaging in repressive deviance. It is important to make clear however, that 
this does not mean that outside SRs do not engage in repressive deviance or that inside SRs do 
not engage in autonomous deviance. They can and sometimes do, as Tittle (1995) again 
predicted. It is here that we see the importance of tenure. Our analysis demonstrated a main 
effect of this variable such that greater levels of tenure were associated with higher levels of 
autonomous deviance, and lower tenure with higher levels of repressive deviance. The 
interaction of tenure and status in our analysis demonstrates that the probabilities of either 
type of deviance are more heavily influenced by tenure. This makes sense if one considers 
that tenure serves as a proxy for experience and knowledge of how an organizations systems 
work and can be exploited. While status may offer access to such systems, tenure provides an 
understanding of how one can exploit such access.  
Thus, while an outside salesperson is inherently more likely to engage in autonomous 
deviance, their ability to do so will be limited by tenure. In this case, one can imagine an 
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outside SR on the first day of the job having a lower likelihood of engaging in autonomous 
deviance than an inside SR with 20 years on the job. As time passes, though, the outside 
person will gain tenure and eventually surpass the inside SR in the likelihood of engaging in 
autonomous deviance because their accumulating tenure will increasingly allow them to take 
advantage of their outside status. Likewise, a long-tenured outside salesperson, though far 
more likely to engage in autonomous deviance will probably also be more capable of 
engaging in repressive deviance than a newly hired inside SR. This argument is strengthened 
when we consider that in this corporate setting inside and outside status are not dependent on 
tenure. Because people do not transition from inside to outside status (or vice versa) as a 
consequence of tenure in this corporation we were able to explore the functioning of tenure 
and status separately and in concert. 
Though this study showed support for some of the root concepts found in CB theory it 
is not without limitations. The primary limitation was that this study assumed months’ tenure 
and position are valid measurements for a control surplus and deficit. Braithwaite (1997) and 
Jensen (1999) both contended that CB theory concepts are difficult to operationalize.20  Even 
Tittle (2004) agreed. Yet, despite this difficulty, the measurements of both a control surplus 
and a control deficit yielded findings consistent with Tittle’s predictions. Secondary 
validation of this measurement is reminiscent of Piquero and Piquero’s (2006) vignette 
finding that a management position (those with higher tenure) predicts autonomous deviance.   
Additionally, this study also assumed a control imbalance condition can exist within 
an individual and act as a motivator. Although the empirical results indicate that a control 
imbalance can be present in the form of a control surplus or deficit, and further appear to act 
as an influence on deviance, the SRs in this study were not available for interviews that could 
have confirmed and contextualized this. Had we been able to speak with them, the question of 
 
20 Even Tittle (2004) acknowledged there was much ambiguity in some of the key concepts. 
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whether or not an imbalance existed and was the driver of such deviance would have been 
more definitively answered. With the addition of a qualitative overlay, it is expected that the 
findings could be validated and made stronger.   
Based on both these limitations and findings, few would argue that future CB research 
might be strengthened in the future through a mixed methods approach combining 
quantitative data of the type we use here with qualitative interviews of those represented in 
that data. Such an approach would allow for researchers to confirm statistically that the 
predicted relationships exist while at the same time allowing us to better understand deviant 
motivation and its source. Our work here represents a preliminary step in this direction by 
employing data comprised of confirmed offenders. 
Doing so, allowed us to think about how such a restriction is accommodated by the 
theory. We alluded to this in the introduction. In Tittle’s original thesis he postulates that 
where control expressed and experienced is equal, there will be no deviance.  We illustrate 
this as a zero motivation point (see again, Figure 3). When a person is control-balanced, there 
is equilibrium between the sources of imbalance (that of the individual and that external to the 
individual, the company in this case). At the intersection of these two points, an individual 
should not be motivated to engage in deviant behavior. But, putting aside this theoretical 
assumption, we know that sometimes people who are at balance do deviate21. We also know 
that people who experience control deficits sometimes engage in autonomous deviance (e.g., 
the low level clerk who discovers a way to embezzle thousands of dollars from the 
company22).  Likewise, people who experience control surpluses engage in repressive 
deviance (e.g., the company manager who leaks embarrassing company information on the 
 
21 In Topalli and Wright (2013) for example, street offenders who had just committed offenses had the money 
and drugs that they desired, and thus, no reason to offend, but still did when opportunities were too attractive to 
ignore. 
22 http://www.devonlive.com/disgruntled-clerk-took-revenge-exeter-bosses-20k/story-21448236-
detail/story.html 
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internet to punish the CEO23). Thus, the prediction would be that in a sample comprised 
entirely of offenders, we would not (by definition) have non-offending, but we would have 
the lowest level of offending where those offenders were experiencing balance.  
Our exploration of CB theory using these data suggests that further exploration of the 
theory is warranted. This is based in part on the operationalization of the two independent 
variables of focus in our analysis, but also with the understanding that this theory requires 
more comprehensive data. First, the dichotomous variable, Position Status (inside vs. outside) 
may seem relatively stable in that employees are not randomly assigned to either status and 
cannot hold both statuses simultaneously. However, one can, across time, be assigned to one 
status for a while and the other at a later point, either within the same company (reassigned 
from outside SR to inside SR for example) or from one company to another (inside SR for 
company A then outside for company B when the employee changes jobs). As such, the 
variable operates as a situational – and thus, dynamic – variable. If the theory’s postulates 
hold true, then change in status should be associated with a change in type of offending. Here, 
we would require data that follows individuals across time, keeping track of their career paths. 
Such longitudinal data are in keeping with the traditions of the life-course perspective (see 
Simpson, 2013; Farrington, 2003; Hagan & Palloni, 1988; Hagan and Albonetti, 1988), but 
here we are talking about a “career-course” perspective. Though a complex challenge, one 
way to potentially obtain such data would be to merge employment records from online career 
websites (such as LinkedIn.com) with corporate investigation data. Moreover, different kinds 
of roles and statuses within a company offer access to different kinds of offending. Because 
status is bestowed upon the individual by the entity exercising control (the company), studies 
that vary the assignment of status to employees would tell us a great deal about the 
mechanisms that underpin how control exercised on the potential offender operate. One 
 
23 http://variety.com/2017/biz/news/snapchat-evan-spiegel-only-for-rich-people-anthony-pompliano-
1202028526/ 
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intriguing notion is that because change in status is a sudden discrete event it may operate like 
a knifing off (Maruna & Roy, 2007) or transition point (Laub & Sampson, 2003) offering 
further opportunity to mesh notions of the life-course perspective with CB theory. 
Second, because the variable Tenure operates as a continuous variable, where the 
source of control derives from the offender’s accumulating experience. There are many ways 
to conceptualize and operationalize this experience; their level of familiarity with the systems 
of the company by virtue of time with the company, their time within a particular branch or 
unit of the company, their time within a given position type, regardless of company, etc. 
These forms of experience are all related to one another to some extent, but one can imagine 
situations where moving from one company to another, between units at the company, or 
from one role to another, would serve to shift the potential offender’s level of imbalance and 
thereby the type and rate of offending. Again, addressing such questions requires a different 
kind of data to be obtained, consistent with those employed with life-course perspectives. In 
applying CB theory to explain deviance in the workplace, we would argue it is important to 
include both status and tenure variables as critical to explaining patterns of offending. 
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